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Abstract
Kenneth Waltz is a celebrated scholar of International Relations whose works have become the
foundation of the neorealist camp of International Relations. One of his most prominent theses is
on the existence of international anarchy, which Waltz calls “the third image,” which creates a
perpetual state of war in the interstate relations. This essay does not examine whether his thesis
is valid, but instead tries to problematize the use of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s texts as the
foundation in creating the perspective of the third image. This paper argues that Waltz’s
misinterpretation of some of Rousseau’s texts makes Waltz’s thesis on international anarchy and
constant state of war differ from Rousseau’s thoughts on state and interstate relations. This paper
will use the Hermeneutics method to provide an alternative interpretation of Rousseau’s works
and criticize Waltz’s interpretation of them.
Keywords:
International Anarchy, Neorealism, Kenneth Waltz, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Hermeneutics.
Abstrak
Kenneth Waltz merupakan pakar Ilmu Hubungan Internasional yang karyanya dikenal sebagai
fondasi dari kaum neorealis pada kajian Hubungan Internasional. Salah satu tesisnya yang
paling menonjol adalah tentang keberadaan anarki internasional, yang oleh Waltz disebut
sebagai "the third image” yang menciptakan keadaan perang terus-menerus dalam hubungan
antarnegara. Esai ini tidak memeriksa validitas tesis tersebut, melainkan mencoba untuk
mempermasalahkan pemahaman Waltz pada karya-karya Jean-Jacques Rousseau sebagai dasar
dalam menciptakan perspektif gambar ketiga. Makalah ini berpendapat bahwa kesalahan
penafsiran Waltz terhadap beberapa teks Rousseau membuat tesis Waltz tentang anarki
internasional dan keadaan perang yang konstan berbeda dari pemikiran Rousseau tentang
negara dan hubungan antarnegara. Makalah ini akan menggunakan metode Hermeneutika untuk
memberikan interpretasi alternatif dari karya Rousseau dan mengkritik interpretasi Waltz.
Kata Kunci:
Sistem Anarki Internasional, Neorealisme, Kenneth Waltz, J.J. Rousseau, Hermeneutika,

INTRODUCTION
During the Cold War, Kenneth Waltz famously said: “It is to a great extent due to
its bipolar structure that the world since the war has enjoyed a stability seldom known
where three or more powers have sought to cooperate with each other or have competed
for existence (The Stability, 907).” This statement marks the perspective of neorealist
camp of International Relations, which focuses on stability rather than seeking peaceful
coexistence. This notion comes from the assumption that a perpetual state of war is the
inevitable condition of the international system. The state of war persists due to the
1
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structure of international anarchy, which is marked by the absence of authority in the
international realm. As a result, the state of war is a condition in which every state is free
to pursue its self-interest and fight other states whose interest overlaps or threatens its
own. Although war is the most extreme scenario of a clash of interest between states, even
when war does not exist, every state is in constant danger, resulting in the need to
strengthen its offensive and defensive power. The moment of negative peace is defined
as a constant struggle to keep the balance of power either by strengthening domestic
armaments or creating alliances (Waltz, Man, State, 221-222). Waltz also claims that
although human nature and the state’s domestic conditions determine inter-state relations,
the system of international anarchy or the third image plays the main role in creating a
perpetual state of war (Man, State, 237-238). This perspective explains the extended
condition of negative peace throughout the Cold War, in terms of the constant balance of
power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, as the most stable era for
the international system. Waltz claims that this condition is the reality we live in, and
every state should consider the consequences of the third image when calculating its
foreign policy, rather than considering its moral obligations (238).
In constructing international anarchy, Waltz relies heavily on Rousseau’s
thoughts, which he claimed to be the roots of the third image perspective (161). His
interpretation places Rousseau as the foundation of realist thinkers of International
Relations, in opposition to idealists like Kant (Williams, 52). However, Waltz’s
interpretation has two inaccuracies, which will be further elaborated on in this paper. The
first criticism is of how he interprets Rousseau’s thoughts on the state of nature and the
birth of society, which lead to his conclusion that the international system shapes state
behavior. Waltz’s adoption of Rousseau’s stag hunt society to prove that an inherently
egoistic nature of human hinders any possible cooperation is inaccurate because such
example was originally used by Rousseau to describe an uncivilized human who does not
know and does not need social interaction. The second criticism is of Waltz’s
interpretation of Rousseau’s skepticism towards Saint Pierre’s Peace Project, from which
Waltz concludes that a peaceful confederation among states is impossible in a state of
international anarchy. Waltz’s conclusion is indeed similar to Rousseau’s; however,
Waltz missed the point of Rousseau’s critique which argues that a peaceful confederation
among states is impossible not because it is the natural condition of interstate relations,
but because the European states that Rousseau observed consisted of corrupt monarchies.

2
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Criticism of Waltz’s interpretation of Rousseau’s texts and neorealism in
International Relations in general is not new, as it has been previously discussed by Aiko,
Williams, and Behr and Heath. Aiko challenged the notion of ‘assigning’ Rousseau to the
realist camp because Rousseau’s critiques on Saint Pierre’s Peace Project did not point to
the impossibility of confederation due to the nature of state, but rather due to the existence
of domestic injustice that renders the peaceful confederation impossible (119). Besides,
Williams also noted that Rousseau’s example of stag hunt society and the logic of anarchy
do not describe the permanent urge of human nature, which we must to submit to, but
rather is an example of an undeveloped or uncivilized human society that can be improved
through the establishment of civil state (66). Finally, Behr and Heath challenged the
neorealist interpretation of Rousseau’s The Social Contract, which treated the state as one
cohesive acting unit but neglected the fact that in order to act as single body politic, the
pre-state society must agree on certain moral values to ensure unity (340). By neglecting
the pre-condition of body politic, neorealists treat every state as a cohesive unit, even
those that do not have a foundation of unity. This paper relies on the works of Aiko and
Williams as the starting point for critiques of Waltz and develops those works further by
highlighting and interpreting the original texts to argue that some of Waltz’s adoption of
Rousseau texts failed to comprehend the context of such texts.
These criticisms will be developed using the hermeneutics approach to explain
this paper’s interpretation of Rousseau’s texts, mainly The Social Contract, A Lasting
Peace through the Federation of Europe and The State of War, and The Discourse on the
Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men, followed by a comparison between
Waltz’s interpretation of Rousseau, which led him to his formulation on the third image.
This paper will begin by explaining the hermeneutics approach and continue with an
explanation of the social context of Rousseau’s thoughts to understand the meaning of his
texts. It will then address Waltz’s interpretation of Rousseau’s thoughts and, finally, will
explain two inaccuracies in Waltz’s interpretation and discuss the implications of these
inaccuracies in understanding Rousseau in relation to International Relations theory.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Hermeneutics as the Art of Interpreting Text
Hermeneutics is the practice of understanding a text by reflecting and making a
moral judgement on its meaning (Gadamer, 92-93). As part of practical philosophy, it is
not merely a technical expertise in understanding the text per se but also involves a moral
judgment of how the ideas within the text bring good to the present society (Gadamer,
3
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93). Thus, the method comprises of three inter-related steps: understanding the context of
the text to grasp its meaning, understanding our present reality, and making a judgment
on how the normative aspects in the text can be implemented in the present reality.
The first step of hermeneutics is to have a real understanding of the text. In
Gadamer’s words:
“The description of the inner structure and coherence of a given text and the
mere repetition of what the author says is not yet real understanding. One has
to bring his speaking back to life again, and for this one has to become familiar
with the realities about which the text speaks. (98)”

The description seems similar to Skinner’s thoughts on how to understand the real
ideas of the text by recognizing and grasping its historical context, including its culture
and intention (36). In order to understand its meaning, the text must not be treated as a
timeless object that can be interpreted independently without considering its relevant
background or the writer’s intentions. For Skinner, this way of interpreting generates
mythologies and not the history of the text (7). Thus, understanding the text is a matter of
grasping the writer’s intentions, understanding his original audience, and recognizing the
social context, which influenced the writing. One of the easiest ways to contextualize a
text is through finding the question or problem that the text intends to address. In this
sense, every text is written as a critique of the author’s social and political condition, or
as an answer to his or her problematic environment (Gadamer, 107). Describing such
question or problem will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the text itself.
The second step is to recognize the impossibility of understanding the writer’s
original intention, while knowing that our present understanding of reality influences our
interpretation. Our own social context influences how we make sense of reality, just as
our understanding of language influences our understanding of the text’s meaning
(Gibbons, 565). Thus, the claim of a neutral or objective understanding of a text is
misleading. We must go beyond the subjective intention of the writer and into the
intersubjectivity between the text and its interpreter (Gibbons, 567). Bridging the context
of which the text was written with the present context that we read it is what Gibbons
called “the fusion of horizons” (Gibbons, 567). “The fusion of horizons” fuses our
horizons with that of the text to create a new meaning from the intersubjectivity process.
Having established an understanding of the two preceding steps, hermeneutics
acknowledges that an interpretation may go beyond the writer’s original intentions
(Ricoeur, 95). Hermeneutics believes that the art of interpretation will never achieve one
4
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definite universal interpretation for all readers. Thus, the interpretation relies heavily on
persuasion rather than proof (Kahn-Nisser 390). Any explanation or judgment that is
offered within this paper is also context-dependent to the author’s social and political
condition, as well as the author’s intentions. This condition makes any conclusion or
judgment within the paper inherently open-ended, and its accuracy can only be measured
through the extent of the paper’s success in convincing its readers.
DISCUSSIONS
The Social Context of Jean-Jacques Rousseau
Rousseau was born in the eighteenth century to a middle class family. His parents
were citizens of Geneva, as was Rousseau himself until he renounced his Genevan
citizenship in 1764 due to his controversial ideas (Riley, 2). At the time, Geneva was a
republic surrounded by large monarchies such as France, Prussia, and Rome (Wokler, 2).
As a typical republican government, Geneva was ruled by the people’s representatives or
grand conseil, which consisted of economically independent men of Geneva from diverse
economic classes (Ryan, 532). However, in practice, the political decisions were made
and monopolized by the petit conseil, which consisted of upper-class oligarchs. These
oligarchs were dismissive of other interests and did not want to share power (Ryan, 532).
Despite this oligarchic influence, Rousseau saw his republic as a better form of
government rather than that of monarchies, although this was an unpopular opinion for
scholars of his era, who generally believed that absolute monarchy resulted in better order
than other types of government (Wokler, 2).
Rousseau travelled to Paris in 1741 and met several “enlightened” writers such as
Diderot and Voltaire (Ryan, 533). He later went to Venice for a year to work as a secretary
for the French Ambassador (Wokler, 7). It is believed that witnessing corruption in the
Venetian government influenced The Social Contract and Rousseau’s general thoughts
on the ideal form of society and government. Most of his writings aimed to criticize the
moral character of the society he lived in, which perpetuated and supported the absolutist
government. Specifically, Rousseau attacked the “enlightened” thinkers who based their
assumptions on natural law (Aiko, 99) and the egoistical and destructive nature of humans
(Rousseau and Gourevitch, 151). Moreover, he drew influence from classic political
philosophers such as Plato, Plutarch, and Grotius who wrote about order and peaceful
relations within society, in order to achieve and maintain the common good. At the same
time Rousseau read Hobbes, whom he later criticized in The Second Discourse on the
Origin and the Foundations of Inequality among Men (Rousseau and Gourevitch, xi).
5
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The Political and Philosophical View of Jean-Jacques Rousseau
Rousseau based his criticisms and opinions of the state and society on his
assumptions about human nature. This distinguished him from the natural law thinkers.
The latter believed that humans are naturally social creatures. Thus, human society
emerged naturally as a means to collectively fulfill human needs and interests (Aiko, 100).
The natural ability to create a society, however, does correlate with the natural ability to
create order and security within that society. Thus, states were created to guarantee social
order and security (Aiko, 101). In other words, humans are naturally social creatures who
seek to socialize with other humans. However, there is no guarantee that these relations
will remain positive and peaceful. Thus, the state was invented to provide order and
security. This understanding led natural law thinkers to even support tyrannical
monarchies as long as the state could maintain order within society.
Rousseau opposed this assumption by saying that human nature is innocent and
without morality. He also said that humans did not naturally socialize with others (Ryan,
543). According to Rousseau, humans have three natural instincts: amour de soi or care
for oneself, pitie or a sense of empathy for the suffering of other human beings, and
perfectibilite or the capacity to develop and learn from others. These first two instincts
also guide other animals throughout their life; however, the last distinguishes humans
from other creatures (Ryan, 543). The amour de soi led humans to self-preservation, but
it was not amour-propre or the egoistic desire to pursue one’s own interests. Rousseau
believed that there were enough resources for everyone, so humans do not need to kill
other humans to maintain self-preservation. Moreover, with the instinct of pitie, humans
do not hurt others in conflicts over resources. They do not even have constant contact
with each other, given the world they live in is vast (Ryan, 544).
Rousseau later remarked that Hobbes’s natural condition of mankind being
egoistic and violent is inaccurate because Hobbes’s theory was based on his observation
of man within society, rather than the natural man (Rousseau and Gourevitch, 151).
Rousseau highlighted the role of pitie as an innate value, which supports man’s capacity
to reason, create bonds of friendship, and produce benevolent actions. The egoistical
behavior of man is thus a product of society, which preserves the reason and fight against
pitie, while simultaneously creating religion, morals, virtue, and laws to temper reason
(Rousseau and Gourevitch, 153).
Humans left this natural state when population increased significantly more than
resources. Their territory became smaller, and they were in constant contact with others.
6
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Society began as a result. Thus, unlike natural law thinkers, Rousseau argued that the
invention of society was not natural (Ryan, 545). Humans began to develop
organizational skills and language to communicate. When society developed into a more
complex form, interaction developed into reason. The amour de soi and pitie turned into
moral sentiments and, by generalizing with others, humans created moral principles to
guide society (Ryan, 546). However, as the moral principle developed, men were no
longer guided by self-instinct, but rather by the moral principles that were shared amongst
society. These impersonal moral standards created fear, guilt, and shame (Ryan, 546).
Society then invented the concept of private property, which created inequality amongst
humans and became a source of conflict (Ryan, 549). Men neglected their natural instincts
and behaved according to amour-propre.
In short, the development of society influenced the perception and morality of its
members. As a result, unlike natural law thinkers who believed that men created society
naturally, Rousseau thought society shaped the behavior of men within that society. The
corrupt state creates immoral members and thus, the function of the state is not only to
create order but to also maintain and develop the morality of its citizens.
Under this context, Rousseau’s thoughts are far from placing all of society in an
alike-unit. There are states of morality or civility and states of immorality or corruption.
These difference shapes the behavior of the state and the citizens within it. Thus,
Rousseau’s thoughts differ from the assumption of neorealists, who treat every state as
alike-unit in the international realm.
Waltz’s Interpretation of Rousseau as the Third Image
In Waltz’s Man, the State, and War the third image explains how international
anarchy has shaped the perpetual state of war among states. He starts his interpretation
by giving two interpretations of the invention of the state according to Rousseau. The first
is through the voluntary will of the people, as described in The Social Contract. The
second is through the historical experience of humans, involving experience, interest,
morality, and necessity as described in A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (167).
Waltz claimed that the first is the result of philosophical thoughts of history, while the
second is the hypothetical reconstruction of history (167).
Waltz later explains the hypothetical reconstruction of human nature and the first
society to justify his argument that personal interest always prevails over the collective
interest in the society without authority. He contends that Rousseau’s example of the stag
7
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hunt society, in which one-member defects to catch a rabbit to fulfill his personal interest
instead of fulfilling the former agreement, shows that the source of conflict arises not
from man’s personal interest, but from the nature of a society without authority (168).
Waltz later shows that conflict first arose in society after humans established constant
relations with others. Although every rational man is said to have the capability to
cooperate in order to pursue the collective interest, insecurity arises when each man can
never be sure whether his counterparts are rational or not. In the end, everyone will choose
to breach the agreement and pursue self-interest rather than take the risk of cooperating
and gaining nothing when other members irrationally breach the agreement (169). This
strengthens Waltz’s argument that the failed agreement is not a result of man’s inability
to be rational, but of the anarchic situation.
Waltz then elaborates on the original state of nature to the creation of the state in
The Social Contract, which produced the authority within society and made agreements
possible because natural freedom changed into civil liberty, instincts into justice, and
possession into property (Man, State, 172). Through possessing civil liberty, man cannot
breach an agreement for his own desires without sanctions from the authority and, thus,
collective interests can be pursued without insecurity. The creation of a civil state made
a moral life for citizens possible. However, the condition outside of the civil state remains
anarchic, under which cooperation is impossible, just as the condition of the first society.
Before discussing the condition of international anarchy, Waltz justifies how the
state can be an acting unit within the international system and set aside dissenting voices
within the state. The state as an acting unit within the international system is defined as
one in which the diverse interests and principles of people within the society are
represented solely by the state’s interest and principle in the international system. His
definition is derived from his interpretation of Rousseau’s body of politics, which
embodies the general will of its members and acts in order to achieve the general will and
maintain its own preservation (Waltz, Man, State, 173). Waltz later emphasizes the
fulfillment of the general will and self-preservation: every state will exercise its
accumulated power as the state’s power to attain the state’s will and maintain its own
existence. The members of the state are absorbed into the state, which decides how to
attain its collective interests. Furthermore, the state perpetuates its authority over its
subjects through patriotism. This patriotism is developed through education and the
continuous learning of general will and general principles of morality. Finally, the society
within the state is united into one body of politics (Waltz, Man, State, 175).
8
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Waltz further strengthens his claim on the unity of state by setting aside a dissent
voice by saying:
“Dissenters within the state are carried along by two considerations: their
inability to bring force to bear to change the decision; their conviction, based
on perceived interest and customary loyalty that in the long run it is to their
advantage to go along with the national decision and work in the prescribed
and accepted ways for its change (178).”

This statement forces powerless dissenters into the state. Any state that fails to
force its dissenters to comply is no longer considered a state and, therefore, falls outside
the discussion. Furthermore, he sees that the unity of state is strengthened by enmities in
the international system, in which every state is pursuing its own general will (179).
Waltz dismisses the possibility of continuous cooperation among good states
because each state operates to achieve its particular general will. These particularities may
clash with one another and produce conflict. As there is no general will in the world of
states, there is no harmony in the international system (Waltz, Man, State, 182). Waltz
applies the logic of the international system in the same way as the first society, before
the state. He later emphasizes Rousseau’s thoughts in the commentaries of Saint-Pierre’s
Peace Project, which says that the states of Europe will fall into conflict at every
opportunity. The public laws of every state of Europe are full of contradictions, which
makes war among them inevitable (Waltz, Man, State, 183). Harmony in interstate
relations is only possible through the balance of power. Conflicts of interest will certainly
arise between states in the perpetual state of war, but the balance of power can prevent an
actual war (Waltz, Man, State, 186).
The Critics on Waltz’s Interpretation of Rousseau
Waltz’s understanding of Rousseau, which leads to his claim that international
anarchy is a perpetual of state of war among states, has two main flaws. First, Waltz’s
image of the international system is an exact adoption of the first uncivilized society,
whereas Rousseau’s civil state does not operate like uncivilized humans. Second, he
interprets Rousseau’s criticism of Saint Pierre’s Peace Project as the impossibility of
cooperation among states within international anarchy, whereas Rousseau’s criticism is
of the inconsistency of its implementation, which rendered the project impossible.
First, Rousseau’s conception of the body politic does not merely unite the will of
society as a general will in order to achieve a common interest and maintain selfpreservation. Beyond the general will, the body of politics of the state also creates a
civilized society with morality, leading it to become the civil state (Rousseau, The Social
9
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Contract, 59). The civilized society shares moral principles that naturally, as discussed in
Rousseau’s state of nature, consist of amor de soi and pitie. He later emphasizes that
civilized man acquires a moral liberty and “makes man truly the master of himself; for to
be driven by our appetites alone is slavery” (Rousseau, The Social Contract, 59). This
shows that the civil state is not driven by amour-propre, where self-interest will be
pursued by all means and human beings are only valued according to their ability to fulfill
self-interest (Williams, 63). Waltz’s description of state behavior, which exercises all of
its power by all means in order to achieve the general will, is a description of Rousseau’s
uncivilized and immoral state that has lost its pitie and is driven solely by amour-propre.
Moreover, Waltz’s claims of international anarchy, derived from his interpretation
of Rousseau’s example of the stag-hunt illustration, is misleading because he makes two
mistakes in his interpretation of the text. First, Rousseau’s stag-hunt illustration is the
depiction of the pre-society condition of savage men, which differs from international
condition. As stated above, the natural condition of man was governed by perfectibilite,
which enabled them to learn others’ behaviors and create an alliance when necessitated
by circumstances. However, as such circumstances are only presented rarely in the natural
condition, the alliance was short-lived and only based on the imminent common interest
(Rousseau and Gourevitch, 163). Rousseau imagines the natural condition as the
condition where men lived independently and rarely met one another. Building trust was
not necessary because there was not a constant need for interaction. This condition cannot
depict the interstate condition, in which constant interaction and mutual engagement in
necessary at some level. Second, the stag-hunt illustration does not confirm the egoistic
behavior of humans because Rousseau believed in the pitie instinct. Instead, it describes
the incapability of pre-society human to plan ahead and sustain interaction with one
another (Rousseau and Gourevitch, 163). Without the existence of language and necessity
to live together, the illustration that describes the defect one member makes at the expense
of the other depicts the limitation of cooperation without any means of deep
understanding and trust building. By no means does this explain the domination of reason
over morality or the egoistic instinct of man, but rather a phase of human progress before
the invention of language and society.
The second main flaw comes from the interpretation of Rousseau’s criticism of
Saint-Pierre’s Peace Project. Waltz believed the text supported his argument for
international anarchy and the perpetual state of war. However, for Rousseau, the problem
was not within the anarchical system. The state of war among the states of Europe was
10
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rooted in the corrupt, tyrannical European states that made the idea of confederation
impossible. Thus, it is not the realistic perspective of Rousseau opposing the idealist
perspective of Saint-Pierre. Rather, it is Rousseau’s criticism of Saint-Pierre, who is
clearly influenced by natural law thinkers. This influence makes him see the eighteenth
century European states as unproblematic as long as they created order within the state
(Williams, 67-68; Aiko 102). Furthermore, his criticism of Saint-Pierre’s Peace Project
is directed towards the inconsistencies that neglect the moral problem within the
European states, but aim to make a moral confederation among them. Rousseau saw the
corrupt monarchies as the source of the perpetual state of war and thought it an impossible
hope that these corrupt governments would comply with the confederation. In his explicit
criticism:
“...princes would have nothing to do with peace on these terms, even if they
calculated their interests for themselves. How will it be, when the calculation
is made for them by their ministers, whose interests are always opposed to
those of the people and almost always to the prince's? Ministers are in
perpetual need of war, as a means of making themselves indispensable to their
master, of throwing him into difficulties from which he cannot escape without
their aid, of ruining the State, if things come to the worst, as the price of
keeping their own office. They are in need of it, as a means of oppressing the
people on the plea of national necessity, of finding places for their creatures,
of rigging the market and setting up a thousand odious monopolies (A Lasting
Peace, 36)."

Rousseau shows that the corrupt state oppresses its people and is driven by amour-propre.
He later offers a solution to the creation of a peaceful confederation in The Social
Contract, which calls for transforming the corrupt state into the civil state.
CONCLUSIONS
Implications for International Relations Theory
The neorealist camp of International Relations has long believed that the state of
war is a constant phenomenon of the international system that cannot be altered. Thus,
they are content to make stability through a prolonged balance of power while burdening
every state with constant, if not increasing, military expenditure to balance world power.
I do not claim that the assumption of neorealism is invalid but rather, I contend that the
use of Rousseau’s text to justify such assumption may be inappropriate. Waltz’s attempts
to portray the condition of society of state and the nature of state by reflecting on
Rousseau’s concept of society of man and man’s natural instincts ultimately cherry picked
Rousseau’s thoughts without considering his entire philosophical works.

11
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This paper also shows a stark difference between Waltz and Rousseau in the
treatment of the most important unit of analysis in politics and inter-state relations. On
one hand, Waltz deemed that the structure of international anarchy makes the state behave
the way it does in interstate relations. On the other hand, Rousseau believed that the
domestic condition of a state influences its behavior. This difference further proves that
Waltz misinterpreted Rousseau’s portrayal of constant distrust among states as a cause of
state’s behavior. Meanwhile the contextualization of Rousseau’s texts shows that such
conditions are the result of certain configurations of the state’s domestic politics. I believe
that it would be more appropriate for Waltz and the neorealist camp to use the philosophy
of natural thinkers’, like Hobbes, to underpin their assumptions. Hobbesian philosophy
clearly supports the egoistic nature of humans, the existence of a constant state of war
and distrust among states, and the identical treatment of all kinds of states as one acting
unit without differentiating between the civil and uncivil state.
Furthermore, I propose the alternative interpretation of Rousseau, which has been
elaborated on in this essay, may become the solution to escape the state of war through
the transformation of the uncivilized state into the civil state. As a civil state creates a
civilized people within itself, so may a group of civil states have peaceful relations and
even create a common law under confederation without losing their sovereignty as a state
to the supra-state being. The behavior of civil states is certainly different from the
immoral or corrupt states, which are more aggressive and reluctant to comply with the
confederation without force from a stronger entity. This explains the different behavior
of an authoritarian state such as North Korea, which tends to defect from an agreement
and refuse to comply with the current international law.
Most modern democratic states reflect the behavior of a civil state. The
development of a more complex and binding confederation can be seen in the European
Union, which, on the one hand, can be seen as a constant struggle for power and selfinterest among its members, but on the other, can be seen as a region without the state of
war. The constant struggle for power within the confederation is inevitable, as it is the
nature of human society to reason with others. However, within the civil state, this
relationship is accompanied by the moral principle of pitie, which ensures peaceful
relations. As a natural instinct of perfectibilite, the positive development of the European
Union has influenced the creation of similar confederations in other regions, such as
ASEAN in South-East Asia, the African Union in Africa, and UNASUR in South
America. Although all of these confederations have different problems in maintaining
12
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their peaceful relations, the solution lies within the transformation of member states to
the fully civilized states. Thus, the International Relations scholar may need to rethink
focus on the state and how to create a civil state instead of seeing it as a similar unit and
focus on the third image.
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